German unification: the economics of transition by Siebert, Horst
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Siebert, Horst
Working Paper
German unification : the economics of
transition
Kiel Working Papers, No. 468a
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Siebert, Horst (1991) : German unification : the economics of transition, Kiel
Working Papers, No. 468a, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/572Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Kiel Working Paper No. 468a
Revised and Enlarged
GERMAN UNIFICATION:
THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION
by
Horst Siebert
Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
The Kiel Institute of World Economics
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Diisternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Kiel Working Paper No. 468a
Revised and Enlarged
GERMAN UNIFICATION:




The author, not the Kiel Institute of World Economics, is solely
responsible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel
Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticisms and
suggestions directly to the author and to clear any quotations
with him.
This paper was presented at the Economic Policy Panel Meeting,
London, 18. - 19. April 1991.- 2 -
1. Introductiont The Policy Choices
In the transformation of a centrally planned socialist system
into a market economy with private ownership, three major areas
of reform have to be solved: establishing the institutional
infrastructure, creating a stable currency and adjusting the real
economy to the new economic environment, especially on the micro
level (Siebert 1991b). In the German case, the institutional
infrastructure and a stable currency represented issues of
integration, namely the harmonization of the different
institutional systems and the introduction of a common currency.
In addition to these broad areas of reform and harmonization,
more specific issues had to be or still have to be tackled. To
each problem corresponds a choice of policy options. The list of
the most important policy choices is impressive:
i) The method of institutional and political integration:
Article 23 versus Article 146,
ii) The method of monetary integration: Extension of the
currency area of the D-Mark to Eastern Germany versus two
different currencies with a flexible exchange rate,
iii) The method of privatization: Compensation versus
reinstituting the previous owner. Privatizing agency versus
a voucher system. Quick privatization versus Treuhand making
firms profitable before privatization,- 3 -
iv) The method of wage adjustment: Differentiation in the wage
structure versus a general levelling of the wage rates in
Eastern and Western Germany,
v) The method of dealing with unemployment: Subsidies to
firms versus transfers to people,
vi) The method of restructuring existing firms: Market process
versus structural policy,
vii) The method of closing the deficit: Cutting expenditures
versus raising taxes or financing by bonds.
The most important policy choices have been made. In principle,
institutional integration was accomplished at one stroke by
Eastern Germany taking over the institutional system of Western
Germany and by joining the Federal Republic according to Article
23 of the German constitution. The other option of institutional
integration according to Article 146 of the German constitution
would have implied an explicit debate on integrating the two
constitutions; this would have been a time-consuming process
envolving a one or two-year period and implying economic
uncertainty, for instance in the area of private investment.
After the integration of the new Lander according to Art. 23, the
debate on revising the constitution can proceed with ease.
Monetary integration was brought about at one stroke also by
extending the currency area of the Deutsche Mark to Eastern
Germany and by establishing the monetary authority of the- 4 -
Bundesbank in the former GDR. The alternative to the currency
union, a transitional approach with two currencies, might have
been attractive from the point of view of using the exchange rate
as a shock absorber for the East German industry and delegating
the conversion of the currencies to the market. It is an open
question whether such an approach might have stopped the
emigration of East Germans in mid-1990 although the appreciation
of the East German currency has contributed to unemployment which
in turn may lead to migration in the future. Moreover, in a two
currency scenario, the DM may have quickly driven out the East
German Mark. In any case, political rationality, necessitating a
quick unification, and the economic rationality of using the
exchange rate as a shock absorber were in conflict. With
institutional and monetary integration being accomplished, the
remaining problem of transition is the adjustment in the real
economy, especially in the firms. In the transition of socialist
economies, the German case can be considered as a laboratory
experiment in real adjustment.
There is a contrast between the medium and long-run positive
economic prospects of German union and the problems of
transition. In the medium and in the long run, the integration
effect, the incentives of a new economic system and the capital
accumulation effect (Siebert 1990c) will be hammering in the
basement, similarly as Hicks (1950) viewed the role of autonomous
investment in eventually moving an economy out of recession. With
these medium and long-run positive prospects, why do we not
observe a burst of economic activity in Eastern Germany as after
the economic and monetary reform in West Germany in 1948, but- 5 -
rather a fall of industrial output from July 1989 to November
1990 by roughly 50 %? As a reminder, after the reform of 1948,
the index of industrial production rose by 50 % in the first five
months (Statistisches Amt fur das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet,
Mai 1949), and annual growth rates of real GNP were 17 % between
the second half of 1949 and 1951.
In the following, I analyze the specific aspects of the
transition process. The factors that impede the quick realization
of the positive effects from integration, from the new economic
system, and from capital accumulation will be studied. And the
main policy options will be discussed. In section 2, the
adjustment of firms to the unexpected shock in their environment
is .analyzed. Then, establishing ownership and the privatization
of firms especially the role of Treuhand, is investigated. In
section 4, the J-curve of output and policies for take-off are
examined, the transition to the market economy in Eastern Germany
is compared to the West German experience of 1948. Policies for
the take-off are reviewed. Then, in section 5, the impact of
German unification on the macroeconomic policy situation is
studied, including fiscal policy aspects, interest rate effects
and exchange rate effects. The paper concludes with two
alternative scenarios.- 6 -
2. Comparative Advantage versus Initial Distortions:
The Adjustment of Firms
From trade and integration theory, the unification of the two
Germanies can be viewed as the integration of two economies which
have a different factor endowment and which are at different
levels of development. More specifically, economic integration
can be interpreted as the addition of qualified labour, land and
a partially obsolete capital stock to the West German economy.
Merging two economies with different endowments implies
integration gains. In addition, opening up a relatively closed
economy to the international division of labour will bring gains
from trade not only in the Heckscher-Ohlin context but also with
respect to intra-industry trade (Siebert 1991b). These gains,
however, cannot take effect instantly.
2.1. Initial Distortions and the Shock to the Socialist Firm
The core of the transition process from a socialist system to a
market economy lies in the adjustment of the firm. The typical
socialist firm is inefficient for a number of reasons: It was
steered by quantity signals and had adjusted to distorted prices,
in the commodity markets as well as in the factor markets.
Commodity prices were determined politically; they were deformed
because of an incomplete integration into the world economy,
because of a multitude of several thousand (firm specific)
exchange rates, because of subsidies and because of the
monopolistic position of the socialist firm. The firm basically- 7 -
represented the whole industry and was a monopolist protected
from internal competition by governmental market delineation and
from external competition by international coordination in the
COMECON. Factor markets including a capital market were
non-existent; energy costs were false and environmental costs
were not signalled to the polluter. The incentive to innovate in
terms of product quality and in terms of new production processes
was extremely weak, so that firms are not competitive in
international markets, especially with respect to product
quality. The capital stock is old, for instance 70 % of equipment
in manufacturing (in Western Germany 50 %) is more than ten years
old and, due to COMECON-technology, was already outdated when
installed.
The transition to a market economy must be understood as an
unexpected shock in the environment of the typical socialist
firm. Like dinosaurs, the huge "Kombinate" are exposed to a
cosmic change in their economic conditions. The transition
problem can be analysed as a change in the constraints: a sudden
drop in the producer's price, a change from a monopoly position
to a competitive situation, competition in product quality that
was not known before, a modification in the system of subsidies
and of external protection and an alteration in access to new
capital from a "soft budget restraint" to a competitive situation
in the capital market. Demand fell abruptly, and the existing
capital stock became obsolete to a large extent. In making the
existing capital stock obsolete, the transition to a market
economy can be compared to a mega oil shock not only relating to- 8 -
the price of one input but to a change in the most important
parameters in the constraint set.
In order to model the adjustment problem of the typical firm
assume that the firm maximizes the present value of cash flow for
a given planning horizon T
I
T
[p(t) Q(t) - w(t) L(t)] e"
r
t dt (1)
The firm starts from an initially given, obsolete capital stock
K(0) - KQ (2)
By attracting or accumulating capital, the firm can produce more
efficiently; a simple way to model this is to distinguish between
old (K ) and new capital (KN) and to make new capital more
efficient than old capital. Thus, the production function is
given by
Q (t) - F [KQf KJJ (t), L (t)] (3)
Net cash flow, i.e. net period profits n are defined as
TT = p F (KQ, KJJ, L) - wL - «5 + r) [PQ KQ + pN K^ (4)
where p is the price of output, w the wage rate, 6 the discount
rate and r interest rate and p ,p.T are the prices of a unit of
ro N
the old capital or the new capital good (including the shadow
price of adjustment costs if adjustment costs are explicitly
considered). The term p (6 + r) represents the implicit rental
rate of old capital. A firm is viable in the long run, if its- 9 -
capital value •• is non-negative. This means that the present
value of the net cash flow (including the user costs of capital




e IT (t) dt 2: 0 (5)
In most cases the present value of the typical socialist firm for
a given obsolete capital stock, that is K= 0, will be negative;
then without adjustment, the firm is not viable. An intertemporal
analysis determines to what extent the present value of the firm
in the new environment can be increased with adjustment. This
analysis shows how period net cash flows of the firm change over
time and whether the present value of the firm is positive or
negative.- 10 -
FIGURE 1- 11 -
With adjustment, we can expect two different scenarios for the
time profile of net period profits: If net period profits in
future periods can compensate the initial cash sink hole and lead
to a positive present value of net profit, the firm is viable
(case a in Figure 1). Then investment and adjustment costs pay
off. In this case, a private investor will be willing to
undertake the investment. If the net period profits of the future
cannot compensate the losses of today (scenario b), the capital
value of the firm is negative and the firm is not viable. It is
apparent that viability of the firm is influenced by whether the
firm has to earn the implicit cost of old capital or whether old
debt will be forgiven.
Thus, the transition to the market economy reveals the
inefficiency of the socialist firm, and output of the
representative firm can be expected to fall; some firms have to
close down. It is important to interpret the adjustment of
industrial output not as a structural problem in the traditional
sense, but as a transformation problem. Besides a change in the
institutional arrangement - in the Wirtschaftsordnung - the
economy has to adjust on the supply side, with new investment,
new products, new firms, new locations, a reallocation of factors
of production and a change in the sectoral structure as well as
in the trade pattern.
The inefficiency of firms is reflected in the distorted sectoral
structure. The sector structure of Eastern Germany was biased in
favour of agriculture and manufacturing, and against services:- 12 -
Whereas 47 % of total employment was in agriculture, energy and
mining, and manufacturing, this relation is 37 % in Western
Germany (Table 1). Western Germany had reduced employment in
manufacturing from 10 (1970) to 8.7 mn. (1989), while Eastern
Germany had increased it from 2.9 to 3.2 mn. during the same
period. A more detailed picture of the sectoral structure of the
ex-GDR is given in Table Al in the Appendix.Bibliothek
des Instituts fur Weitwirtschaft
- 13 -
Table 1 - Employment by Sectors in Eastern Germany and Western Germany, 1989
(shares in %)






























Source: DIW [1990a]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik [1989];
Statistisches Bundesamt [1989a]; own calculations. Rounding error.- 14 -
Trade structure is distorted as well. In 1989, 72.6 % of East German
exports went to the COMECON countries (the figure for West Germany is
4.6 %; see Table 2). This is the result of the intra-bloc
specialization philosophy of the COMECON. Moreover, like all
centrally planned economies, Eastern Germany has followed an import
substitution strategy with respect to Western market economies
attempting to produce the product set of the world economy. Its
structure in basic industry, which historically used to be
complementary to West Germany's structure, became more and more a
replica of the West German mold, albeit on a less efficient level.
Exports of the ex-GDR to the market economies were biased in favour
of semi-manufactured and against finished manufactured goods.
Table 2 Export Share of Eastern Germany and Western Germany by















































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1991).- 15 -
For the ex-GDR, the share of exports in GNP is estimated at 25 %.
This is low for a small open economy. If the international
division of labour is given its full scope, one would expect
Eastern Germany to have an export share similar to that of
countries of comparable size in terms of population, i.e., in the
range of 40-50 %. Moreover, it is well established that regions
in a country have a higher export share than countries of the
same size. This gap in the export share indicates the magnitude
of the transformation of the economy that has to be performed.
2.2. The Adjustment of Firms
With the institutional infrastructure and the monetary system
being established, the microeconomic restructuring of firms is
the central problem in the economics of transition. We have to
differentiate between the adjustment of existing firms and the
creation of new firms. With respect to existing firms
("Kombinate"), three aspects, though interrelated, must be
distinguished: establishing legally independent organizational
units, accomplishing economic efficiency and setting up private
ownership.
Dismantling of the state-owned enterprises implies splitting
up firms into smaller units. In the German case, by law 316
Kombinate were turned into 8,000 legally independent firms which
still existed in a legal sense. Thus, in creating new
organizational units a historical criterion was used. Breaking up
government enterprises into smaller legally independent units in
this way is somewhat arbitrary in economic terms, and it does not- 16 -
yet solve the problem how to make these new units efficient. But
a smaller unit is easier to handle and more flexible. In
addition, the remaining 8,000 units have to be dismantled further
if the sum of subunits resulting from breaking up the firm have a
higher capital value than the firm ifself. Thus, breaking up
large firms may be a way to increase the present value of the
firm as defined in equation 5. If firms as a whole are not viable
and have to be closed, divestiture must take place in order to
privatize the viable parts. Moreover, organizational subunits of
state monopolies should have the option to declare themselves as
legally independent.
Making existing firms efficient requires a spectrum of measures
ranging over a wide area. First, a firm has to establish the
product or product set it can sell in the market. For instance,
the firm may have to develop a new product. Second, firms tended
to be as self-sufficient as possible producing their own inputs
in order not to depend on the delivery from other suppliers.
Thus, the production of intermediate inputs may have to be given
up. This also applies to the repair department, to the
transportation division and other functions. Third, new
production technology will be necessary in most cases requiring
investment. Fourth, marketing is needed and a distribution system
(and service system) has to be built up. Moreover, there are many
other aspects of the adjustment of firms including organizational
changes, introducing new management techniques and, in most
cases, reducing the work force. All these adjustments represent a
supply side response to a shock. Supply side adjustment requires
time. Adjustment will imply costs, and the issue is whether- 17 -
adjustment will lead to a positive present value of profit or
not. This determines whether a firm is viable and whether it has
access to new capital. If the present value of profit (including
adjustment cost) is negative, the firm is not viable and has to
close down (see below).
Eastern Germany will experience a process of structural change
similar to other West European countries in the past thirty
years, only with less time available for adjustment. Ailing
industries, which are not competitive on the international
markets, such as shipbuilding and parts of the steel and textile
industry, and pollution- and energy-intensive sectors will have
to shrink. The underdeveloped service sector will have to expand
considerably. The size of the structural adjustment needed is the
result of the distortions arising from central planning.
An important aspect of the restructuring of the economy is the
creation of new firms. A successful transition requires a
Schumpeterian process of the formation of new and small firms. As
a matter of fact, it is more important to have new firms than to
restructure the old ones. New firms will soak up workers from the
inefficient old firms and will help to solve the unemployment
problem. Thus, conditions have to be established such that new
firms can come into existence. Market entry barriers must be
abolished, location space must be available and finance must be
accessible especially for new and small firms. The old firms
should not be allowed to sit on their location space, if they are
not viable; protecting employment at inefficient units impedes
the birth of new firms. It is worth while to recall that the- 18 -
majority of employment occurs in the small firm; 79 % of
employment in non-agricultural sectors in Western Germany is in
firms with less than 500 employees (Schmidt 1990).y
/'
- 19 -
3. The Incentives of the Market System versus Ownership
Uncertainty; Privatization
Moving from a centrally planned economy with government ownership
of the means of production to a market economy will improve the
incentive system of the economy and increase economic efficiency.
Motivation of people will change. This holds for entrepreneurs,
who were non-existent so far and for whom expected profits will
represent a strong stimulus as well as for workers, for whom pay
and effort will be more closely related. Economic decisions will
be delegated to the market and will be depoliticized. Markets
will allow gains from specialization; for instance, markets
deliver products at the right time and the right place, so that
large inventories are no longer necessary and idleness of labour
and other resources can be prevented. In many cases markets
substitute hierarchies (Williamson 1979).
3.1. Establishing Ownership
An important prerequisite for the incentive mechanism to play is
property rights. With institutional integration according to
Article 23, the new Lander took over the West German legal system
so that property rights are clearly respected and there is no
property right uncertainty per se. But the general respect for
property rights does not yet solve the question who owns what;
property rights certainty does not yet guarantee ownership
certainty . In the transition to a market economy, new owners- 20 -
have to be established, that is property rights for specific
pieces of land and for specific firms have to be assigned.
For the assignment of property rights, the following options were
available:
Reinstituting previous owners
Starting a completely new allocation of property rights, for
instance through a voucher system or by selling firms (and
land) to new owners, and
Giving property rights to the actual user.
Two main criteria were applied to the choice of the assignment
method: respect for private property rights and the necessity of
a quick transition including the impact on investment, growth and
employment. Clearly, respect for private property rights
dominated the choice. First, there was the political argument
that you cannot start a market economy in Eastern Germany if the
expropriations of the past are not corrected. Note that some
important decisions were taken with the GDR government still in
power. Second, there was the risk that the Constitutional Court
would not have accepted a solution in which previous ownership
was not respected. For instance, restricting restitution to those
expropriated in 1972 and after and compensating in the earlier
cases was not sincerely discussed. Also, a completely new
allocation of property rights never was an issue. With no time
available for an academic "Gedankenexperiment", the analytical- 21 -
implications of the allocation of property rights in the
transformation of a socialist economy were not thought through
and were thus not available as a counter position that might have
influenced the intellectual debate. Finally, giving the property
rights to the actual users may be a possible approach in other
cases of establishing ownership such as defining transferable
emission rights in environmental policy, but this method is not
applicable to the transition to a market economy because it would
benefit the former nomenclatura.
With respect to the assignment of ownership the following
decisions were taken:
i.) The basic decision was to reinstitute the previous owners
who were expropriated since 1949 by the GDR-government (and
those expropriated prior to 1945). Reinstitution will not
apply to those who were expropriated by the Russian military
governnment in the period between 1945 to 1949, the argument
being that the Soviet Union explicitly required this as a
condition for agreeing to unification. This procedure has
been upheld by a decision of the Constitutional Court from
April 23, 1991. Compensation will be used when pieces of
land of different owners had been combined into new units
which cannot be easily separated, for instance when land was
used for construction (housing, roads, industrial buildings
etc.). So far, 1,2 mn. claims of previous owners relating to
1.5 mn. properties have been registered. It is estimated
that these claims account for one-third of all land
(according to press reports). In the city of Dresden, 40,000
applications for restitution have been filed, but only 700
were decided (May 1991).- 22 -
ii) Treuhand - the German privatization agency - has become
owner of all joint stock companies that have been formed by
law out of the "Kombinate" (§1 of the Treuhandgesetz). In
addition, Treuhand is responsible for the publicly owned
agricultural estates as well as forestry activities, and
agricultural and foresty land which is used by cooperatives
and individuals. This alone accounts for two-fifth of the
area of Eastern Germany (28 % of agricultural land, 66 % of
forestry land).
iii) Firms that were managed by municipalities and counties - and
the land belonging to them - have become trustee ownership
of the federal government (not of Treuhand). Municipalities
can apply to obtain these firms. So far, there have been
16,000 applications. Public buildings are property of the
respective political units (Lander, municipalities); there
is special property of the railroads and the postal service.
iv) Publicly owned housing has been turned over to
municipalities. All other assets have become property of the
Treuhand.
In practice, it has proven to be extremely difficult to solve the
ownership problem. First, assigning new property titles requires
an assignment rule that can be clearly applied. However, the
assignment described above implies an inconsistent allocation of
property titles. The matching of owners and properties to land
and firms does not yield disjunctive sets. One specific problem
is that it is difficult to distinguish between the ownership of a- 23 -
firm and the ownership of land. Second, for forty years title
records have been neglected, especially for firms. Conflicting
claimants are not unusual. Third, local administration has to
reinstitute the previous owner and to decide the 1,2 mn.
applications for reinstitution. So far, this has proved to be a
severe bottleneck with decisions not being taken as of May 1991.
Fourth, when the market value of a piece of land and the
compensation rate differ, there is a strong incentive to demand
reinstitution instead of compensation and to go to the courts.
Court decisions including the sequence in the hierarchy of the
administrative court system will take years, up to half a decade.
Fifth, as of March 1991 it was not possible to clearly delineate
the cases where compensation had preference over restitution. As
a practical matter, for an existing firm, there tend to be many
claimants when the firm has changed over forty years adding
pieces of land and additional buildings.
The implications of ownership uncertainty are severe. As of March
1991, the privatization of a firm by Treuhand was frozen if
claims by previous owners were announced. Thus, Treuhand could
not proceed with privatization. This implied that the
privatization of firms was blocked. Another aspect related to the
insufficient title records. As of March 1991, there were cases in
which Treuhand had concluded a sales contract with a potential
investor but the ownership,of Treuhand had not yet been recorded
in the title records for the 8,000 firms established by law.
Consequently, the sales contract is contingent upon Treuhand
ownership being established in the title records. This difficulty
will now be avoided by a new procedure according to which a- 24 -
Treuhand document will be binding for the title records. Even
with this obstacle gone, it may take 7-9 months before the new
owner in the above mentioned sales contract is established in the
title records. Before ownership certainty is formally recorded/
no new owner will invest.
A new law (Gesetz zur Regulierung offener VermSgensfragen -
Vermogensgesetz) on establishing ownership has been passed in
March 1991. The solution attempted is to speed up the process of
reinstituting the previous owner, for instance through a
preliminary installation of the previous owner, and to give a
clear preference to compensation either when potentially viable
firms would be destroyed by reinstitution or when new investments
are planned. In order to obtain preferential treatment, the
investor needs a certificate of investment made out by the actual
user (federal, Lander, the local administration and Treuhand).
This may be a problem in the case of competing investment
projects. With such a certificate, Treuhand can install the
investor preliminarily. However, one has to realize that this
law, though it may improve the actual situation, still sticks to
the concept that ownership titles are established by
administrative decisions. This may not rule out that a previous
owner may question an administrative decision of ownership
assignment by Treuhand in the administrative court system. The
alternative would have been to give up the restitution principle
and to sell property rights to new owners. Although the supply
side of such a market in property rights has to be organized
administratively, sales, as a rule, would not have been checked
by the judicial system. The April 23 verdict of the- 25 -
Constitutional Court has reduced but not eliminated the role of
restitution. In ruling out the undoing of the expropriations
during 1945 - 1949, the Constitutional Court has signalled that
restituting does not have to dominate the solution for
expropriatons after 1949; moreover the Court has provided some
hints for the compensation procedure including for the amount of
compensation. This may be helpful in cases where a piece of land
being a part of a firm originally had a private owner.
Apparently, the six months since October 3, 1990 have
sufficiently shown the negative implications of ownership
uncertainty and the Constitutional Court has weighed these
negative effects in its verdict. Note that a lower compensation
may be an incentive to obtain restitution in the courts.
3.2. Treuhand
Treuhand - a privatization agency - has been charged with
privatizing the 8,000 firms (and due to dismantling now 9,500
firms) with 40,000 plants. Treuhand is a holding company owning
firms with 4,7 mn employees (in 1990) which amounts to the
employment of the 100 largest West German firms. Its role is to
"restructure - under competitive conditions - and privatize
the previous government owned firms" (§25 of the Unification
Treaty) and- 26 -
to privatize (§2, (1), Treuhand Law) and to "promote the
structural adjustment of the economy to the requirements of
the market" (§2 (6) Treuhand Law)
The small privatization programm in the service sector is well
under way. Larger retail stores and smaller hotels are all
privatized, small stores and restaurants are privatized to 70 %
and pharmacies to 50 % (March 31, 1991; see Table 3). A
completely different picture holds for industrial firms. Here
only 12 % of industrial firms of the producing sector have been
privatized. Within the Treuhand organisation, the head office is
in charge of firms with more than 1,500 employees, the smaller
firms being delegated to the regional branches of Treuhand. Up to
March, 378 firms have been privatized by the head office, out of
which 291 are industrial units (the remaining belong to the
service sector) and 599 firms (491 industrial firms) have been
privatized by the regional branches. (Up to April, 444 firms were
privatized by the head office and 1156 by the regional branches).
In the industrial area, the speed of privatization has increased
from 90 units in October 1990 to 321 in February 1991 (November
120, December 164; January 230). Within the producing sector,
privatization varies with sectors. 40 % of the machine and
vehicle industry is privatized, 28 % of food production, 17% of
the electronics industry and 12 % of the chemical industry.
Suprisingly, in the construction sector which is important for
take-off only 7 % of the firms to be privatized are privatized.- 27 -
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) March 31, 1991.
Source: Maurer et al. (1991)- 28 -
For the sale of firms up to April 1991, Treuhand has received 7
bn DM. It should be noted that this figure represents gross
revenue; in many areas Treuhand has taken over old debt of firms
as well as an obligation to finance the rectification of unknown
environmental damages of the past as well as other liabilities,
for instance when a firm was not covered against product risks.
So far, 333 firms evaluated as non-viable are being closed (head
office 112, regional branches 231) with 87,000 employees
affected.
The decision of using the Treuhand approach and not a voucher
system in the German case may have political reasons, but the
conditions for privatization differ from Eastern Europe where the
voucher system is seriously discussed. First, there is a large
potential to quickly attract new capital to the East German firms
because there is no exchange rate risk (relative to Eastern
Europe), no risk of changes in the institutional conditions
(including no severe risk of sudden changes in taxation) and no
political risk. The privatization procedure must tap this
potential of private capital transfer. In this context, a voucher
system would be too slow. In such an approach, a voucher defining
a title to all government owned firms is given out to each member
of the population, either free or for payment. The voucher (or
units of the voucher) then will be exchanged in a second stage
against shares of a specific firm. The relative price between a
unit of the voucher and a share is determined by a market
equilibrium between the supply of and demand for shares of a
firm. Second, new management must be established quickly. This is- 29 -
necessary because firms need a new strategy and because the old
nomenklatura should disappear. The voucher system does not easily
solve this issue of corporate control (Frydman and Rapaczynski
1991). Third, the opportunity costs of delay are especially
relevant in the German case. A divergence in production levels
and employment between East and West would necessitate additional
transfers and may lead to an inefficient and extremely costly
structural policy. Therefore, the voucher system never was
seriously discussed in the German case, and the Treuhand approach
seems better suited.
The approach of establishing a privatization agency has the
potential advantage of partially separating the policy arena from
privatization; however, there are severe risks in such an
organizational approach. First, a dense network of cooperation
between the Treuhand and various political bodies has been
established (Round tables, regional conferences). Second, any
organization has a tendency to perpetuate its existence.
Therefore, there should be some institutional constraints. One
promising approach is to give firms the right to initiate a sale
with a potential buyer and then to submit the contract to a
bidding process within a prescribed time period. Additionally the
potential buyer should have the right to propose a sale and to
initiate a bidding process. Third, the Treuhand cannot fulfil the
role of making firms viable before they are privatized - a role,
however, that is explicitly stated in the preamble of the
Treuhand law (Treuhandgesetz). Treuhand does not have information
on the economic prospects of 9,500 firms and 40,000 plants. It is
therefore mandatory that Treuhand concentrates on privatization.- 30 -
Fourth, there will be strong political pressure on the Treuhand
to ease the burden of structural adjustment of firms by giving
credits to firms that actually are not viable and there is some
risk that Treuhand will degenerate into a ministry of structural
policy. In the board of trustees, the governors of the new Lander
(5) and representatives of the trade unions (4) form already a
strong bloc voting in favour of a slow pace in structural
adjustment. In addition, there are two representatives of the
federal government so that the polity has 11 members out of 24.
This definitely is a strong influence of the political arena. The
Treuhand should not undertake structural policy because it would
repeat the mistakes of the planning system that has been given
up. Section 6 of § 2 of the Treuhand Law requiring to "promote
structural adjustment" should not be interpreted too literally.
With the organizational structure of Treuhand given, the results
of privatization will depend on the privatization procedures
used. Methods to privatize firms can be ordered on a continuum.
Access of firms to the stock market establishes a reliable
evaluation of the capital value of a firm by many buyers,
including a market judgement on economic viability. In the German
case, this would, in principle, represent a possibility for some
East German firms, but access to the stock market is subject to
many preconditions which are not fulfilled. Moreover, it is a
time-consuming process. In addition, only very few firms are
viable. On the other extreme of the continuum, there is "informal
selling" as a way to privatize, with one party or only a few on
the buyers' side. Here the advantage is that informal selling
does not require much time, but the buyer's side of the market is- 31 -
too "thin" giving rise to the possibility of a too low selling
price. In between the two extremes of privatization methods there
is a formal bidding process. Such a bidding process has the
advantage of avoiding a too "thin" market in revealing the
willingness to pay of potential buyers; competition among
potential buyers may be helpful in stimulating the imagination of
potential new owners on what to do with a firm. Bidding also has
the merit of providing new management quickly and - in the German
case - injecting new capital. Thus, the bidding process which has
been used extensively in mergers and acquisitions in the US
establishes a market for firms (Smith 1991). The bidding process
has the additional advantage of including international buyers
and preventing monopolistic positions of German firms. What is
much more important, foreign investors might be more interested
to use Eastern Germany as a location for their production of
internationally tradeable products whereas West German firms may
specialize in establishing a distribution system considering
Eastern Germany as a market to be served from West German
capacity or as their extended workbench.
Bidding will de facto be a two-stage process. In the first stage,
potential buyers have to be identified, and the specifics of the
contract have to be narrowed down. In the second stage, the
formal bid, for instance in a closed envelope, occurs. Among the
specifics to be determined is the allocation of environmental
vintage damages (pollutants in the soil, health hazards of
workers and residents), old debt and other liabilities such as
product liabilities. In practice Treuhand, i.e. the government,
has to take over these risks.- 32 -
On the average, Treuhand does not use the formal bidding process
and explicitly considers the intentions of potential buyers with
respect to investment plans and employment guarantees. This
procedure may be questioned. First, it is open to what extent
these promises can be made binding. Second, these aspects move
the privatization procedure to the informal selling approach.
Third, they implicitly mean a preference for West German
investors. One solution may be that stipulations, for instance an
investment, are written into the sales contract, and the final
bidding only refers to the sales price.
Establishing a semi-stock market for East German firms with a
less formal stock exchange admission regulation
(Borsenzulassungs-Verordnung) has not been seriously discussed.
This would have meant that firms have an easier access to the
capital market, and suppliers of capital possibly take a greater
risk. However, this approach is only feasible when firms are
viable. In addition, an issue may be that this procedure makes it
easier for the old management to stay in power. German banks
which in Western Germany , in some instances, helped to
restructure firms endangered with bankruptcy did not take over
the role of providing East German firms with capital temporarily.
Management buy-outs so far have not been too important.
The opinion has been voiced that putting a whole economy up for
auction will severely affect the price of firms to be sold and
that a macroeconomic financial restraint of all buyers will limit
the possibilities of privatization (Sinn 1991). This may be
relevant for countries in Eastern Europe and may also relate to, - 33 -
selling land in Eastern Germany on a large scale. However, it is
not a relevant problem with the capital value of many of the
firms to be sold being negative.
Firms that are not viable must be closed down. The following
cases have to be distinguished. First, a firm may have a positive
present value (equation 5) with the old capital stock and without
adjustment. Second, the firm has a positive present value after
adjustment, so that it can recuperate its investment outlays and
its adjustment costs. In both cases, Treuhand should have no
difficulties in selling the firm or the firms should be able to
raise capital in the capital market. Third, for most firms
viability is to be defined according to bankruptcy law: Old debt
should be foregone, and environmental damages should be taken
over by government. If after these measures a firm still has a
negative capital value the question is whether it can attract
capital for adjustment and restructuring and whether its capital
value will become positive, including the investment outlays.
This category of firms is viable because net period profits
it'defined as
TT'= p F (KQ, KJJ, L) - wL - «J + r) (pN J^) * o (5»)
are positive. Fourth, if the firm can cover its variable cost
without adjustment, i.e.
TT"=p F(«) - wL £ o (5")
this does not represent a problem because financial support of
Treuhand is not needed. Fifth, if conditions 5'and 5'' are not- 34 -
satisfied, the firm must be closed down. The receipts from
privatization should not be wasted on subsidizing non-viable
firms.
This fifth category of firms will be the problem cases for
Treuhand; and it will be the object of conflicting views:
Politicians in Eastern Germany will point out that keeping firms
afloat is one way to protect people from unemployment. The
counter position is that in an economy of transition there are
better ways to protect the people and that it is paramount to
uncouple the protection of people from subsidizing non-viable
firms. Another argument is that the spatial pattern of industrial
location has a hysteresis effect and that closing down important
industries in Eastern Germany will reap the region of its
development potential. However, this argument neglects the
systematic behaviour of structural policy and the argument can
thus be turned around: keeping the inefficient firms alive,
implies not using a chance to modernize and perpetuating the old
structure. This means opening the door to a mezzogiorno scenario.
Treuhand will be constrained by its budget. At this stage (May
1991), a balance sheet for Treuhand does not yet exist. The
balance sheet of Treuhand contains the assets and liabilities of
Treuhand itself (including its regional units) as well as the
cumulative balance sheets of all the firms. The opening balance
sheets of all firms may only be in later in 1991. Liabilities of
Treuhand include old debts of firms taken over by her, if the
debt cannot be passed on to potential buyers as well as
liabilities taken over when firms are privatized. Old debt- 35 -
amounts to 100 bn. DM; Treuhand pays the interest on these debts.
These payments actually are amounting to 7 bn DM. Treuhand has
granted a credit line to firms of 30 bn. DM in order to allow
them to pay wages and to operate in the starting phase of the
currency union. It is open to what extent these credits will be
repaid. On the other side of the balance sheet, the value of the
existing firms is not too large, possibly negative as is
indicated by gross receipts of 5.7 bn DM by from selling firms up
to March 1991 not counting liabilities taken over by Treuhand and
funds needed to keep the firms afloat before the sale.
Conceivably, firms will have a negative price, when sold.
With respect to the operating budget for 1991, Treuhand expects
revenues from privatization of 14 bn DM with expenditures of 37
bn DM. Debt of Treuhand will thus increase by 23 bn DM in 1991
(Table 4). Treuhand is funded by credits according to a credit
line authorized by the federal government.- 36 -
Table 4 Operating Budget of Treuhand 1991 (bn DM)
Revenues Expenditures
Privatization Costs of Privatizing 5
- Producing service 10 Restoration of Firms 12
sector






Credits 23 Other Ezpediture 3
37 37
a
) Old debt 7 bn DM; Kreditabwicklungsfunds 5 bn DM- 37 -
4. Investment and Growth versus the J-Curve of Transition;
Policies for the Take off
From growth theory and from historical experience we know that a
country with a relatively low capital stock per head initially
but with technical skills and innovative potential will have high
growth rates. Western Germany whose capital stock was partly
destroyed by the war and that needed additional capital to equip
the inflowing 12 millon refugees experienced a high growth rate
of 7.5 % during the period 1950-60. Italy (5.7 %) and Japan
(8.1 %) also had high growth rates in the 1950s. High growth
rates were accompanied by a high investment ratio. On the other
hand, countries with a capital endowment not so much affected by
the war had lower growth rates (United States 3.2 %; United
Kingdom 2.6 %) and a lower investment ratio (Barro 1987/ Siebert
1991b). In contrast to this long-run view, we observe a different
short-run development.
4.1. The J-curve of Output
In the adjustment of output and employment, the inefficiencies of
the old planning system are clearly revealed. Aggregating over
the fall in output (or even the closure) of the typical socialist
firm, resulting from the shock in the economic environment, the
transition from a planning system to a market economy is
associated with a decline in output and employment for the
economy as a whole. It can be expected that output will pick up
at some time so that we have a J-curve in output with a dip, a- 38 -
valley or a deep gorge - where output will first fall and then
start to rise. The shape of this curve is not exactly known. It
depends on the inefficiency of the existing firms, on the speed
and methods of privatization, on the speed with which new firms
come into existence and on the conditions of the process of
restructuring.
The statistical measurement of the J-curve is loaded with
difficulties. The transition implies a sizable change in the
price vector of the economy, and indices of production use the
outdated initial obsolete price weights of the pre-reform period.
For instance, for data on East Germany's industrial output
2
(calculated by East German authorities until December 1990) the
price weights of 1985 are applied. In addition to twisted price
weights, the quantities of the pre-reform period representing the
basis of comparison are also distorted as an indirect effect of
deformed prices. Moreover, statistics of the old period may be
deliberately beautified ("prisky effect") , and gross and net
values of production may be falsely specified. Finally, new
activities may not yet be adequately reported. Consequently,
indices of production may not be meaningfully compared.
So far, we only can observe the falling branch of the J-curve. In
the East German case, the index of industrial output fell by
about 50 % from July 1989 to December 1990 with the main decline
in mid-1990 and a small decline in December 1990 (Figure 2, see
also Table A.2 in the Appendix) despite subsidies of an- 39 -
unprecedented magnitude. Actually, available data seem to suggest
that the fall in industrial output may have come to a stop, but
decisions on closings have been postponed, and for the time being
a final assessment is not yet possible. The picture of the
J-curve also can be observed for different sectors of the economy
with the decline being especially pronounced for building
materials, foods, metallurgy and textiles (Figure 3).- 40 -
FIGURE 2







"Index of industrial production.
Source Gemehsames Statistisches Amt der neuen Bundesldnder 1990, BundeswHschaftsmNsteHum 1991.- 41 -
FIGURE 3
Sector-specific J-Curves of Output in East Germany















































Source: Oemelnsames Statlstlsches Amt der neuen Bundeslttnder 1991.- 43 -
The fall in GNP is not exactly known. It is estimated that real
GNP is 15 % lower than in 1989, and GNP will fall once more in
1991 by roughly 15 %. The Federal Statistical Office
(Statistisches Bundesamt 1991b) using West German evaluation
procedures estimates the GNP of the ex-GDR in the second half of
1990 at 105 bn DM, 8.3 % of the West German GNP (population 26
%; compare Table A3). So far there is no explicit survey of the
future closure of firms, with most of the closures still to come.
On the positive side, 195,138 new businesses, mostly very small
units including one-man firms, have been registered in the period
from July 1990 to February 1991 (net registrations). New firms
are registered at a rate of 20,000 per month.
So far, we have no data on private capital flows to East Germany.
According to publications by Treuhand, short- and medium term
investment plans of new owners of firms in Eastern Germany run at
50 bn. DM, with 20 bn. DM private investment (4 bn in 1990), 10
bn. DM railway and postal service, and 20 bn. public
infrastructure.
Registered unemployment rose from 140,000 in June 1990 to 361,000
in August, 642,200 in December 1990 and 836,940 in April 1991
(Figure 4). The number of people on short-time work amounted to
656,000 in June and 2,017,600 mn in April 1991 (see table A2 in
the appendix). Moreover, net emigration rose from about 10,000
per month in May and June to about 30,000 in July - September
1990. After October 1990, official data on migration are no
longer provided. Informal information indicates that the- 44 -
migration has fallen to a low level ( 10,000 - 15,000 per month).
The number of employees in Eastern Germany has fallen by 1.3
mill, from 9,787,000 (second half of 1989) to 8,476,000 people in
the second half of 1990 and 8,193,000 in the fourth quarter of
1990 - a reduction of 1.7 mill. (Table A2). Employees of Eastern
Germany include commuters estimated at 250,000 - 300,000. Note
that total employment of the pre-reform period reflects the
conditions of the old system; therefore with higher wages,
voluntary employment after all the adjustment has taken place,
that is the long-run equilibrium employment for instance for
married women, will be considerably lower than the pre-reform
employment. The transition of employment will not follow a full
"J" but a "u". (Figure 4).- 45 -
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Source: Own calculations.- 46 -
Employment responds with some time lag to output; it takes more
time to adjust employment than output. Thus, employment is still
falling while GNP and the industrial output are stagnating. For
the upswing of the u-curve of employment this time-lag can also
be expected. Thus, employment in industry still has to fall for
some time, when industrial output is already recovering. In the
service sector, however, an increase in output is closely linked
to additional employment.- 47 -
4.2. 1948 - The Wrong Analogy?
Why do we not observe the same spurt of development as in 1948 in
Western Germany? As a reminder, 1948 was a comprehensive currency
and economic reform".' The monetary overhang of a supressed
inflation dating back to 1936 was reduced by exchanging 100
Reichsmark into 6.5 new DM for financial assets and using a 1 : 1
ratio for 60 DM per head only. The centrally administrated
economy was given up and prices were set free for most
commodities (not for basic foods; iron and steel, wages, housing
rents and public services). One important difference of 1990 to
1948 is the distortions in the representative socialist firm
experiencing an unexpected shock; a second difference is
ownership uncertainty. Another argument is that in Western
Germany the shock really occured in 1945, and not in 1948
(Schmieding 1991). In 1945, industrial production in Western
Germany dropped to a quarter of the level of 1936 (Ritschl 1985).
In 1948, production had nearly doubled relative to the 1945 level
having reached roughly 50 percent of the 1936 level. Thus some
adjustment already had taken place prior to 1948 eliminating the
most important bottlenecks. Compared to the J-curve of output in
Eastern Germany in 1990/91, output rose steeply after the Erhard
reforms in 1948 (Figure 5), and contrary to a u-curve of
employment, employment remained stable although unemployment
rose due to the inflow of refugees.
Four additional factors play a role in making 1990 different from
1948; the appreciation of the East German Mark, labour market- 48 -
regulations and the wage setting process, specific bottlenecks
and the aspirations of the East German population.- 49 -
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Source: Schmieding (1991. p. 16). updated. Third Quarter 1947/1989 = 100.- 50 -
4.3. Appreciation of the East German Mark
In the adjustment of the firms in Eastern Germany the transition
problem to a market economy overlaps with the appreciation of the
East German Mark. If we only are concerned with the
competitiveness of firms of a socialist country in transition, a
depreciation of the currency is an appropriate step to ease the
burden of transition. However, depreciation of the currency
cannot compensate lacking product quality, inefficient marketing,
an inadequate distribution network and the other shortcomings of
the socialist firm. In the German case, there was the political
problem that a very quick political union was required which did
not allow a two-currency area with a flexible exchange rate
serving as a shock absorber for the East German industry. Thus
political rationality dominated purely economic considerations.
The extent of appreciation of the East German Mark is difficult
to determine. Neglecting product, firm or sector specific
exchange rates, the foreign currency coefficient of 1989
indicates costs of 4.4 GDR-Marks to earn one unit of the (West)
Deutsche Mark. Relative to this admittedly distorted exchange
rate, the East German Mark was appreciated by a factor of 4.4
whereas in 1949 the DM was depreciated by 21 %. In addition, the
artificial fixed exchange rate system of the COMECON, the
transfer rouble, is not used any more with Eastern European
currencies aiming at convertibility. As a consequence, intra
COMECON-trade is breaking down. Moreover, demand from the USSR,
so important for East German firms, is falling considerably due
to internal problems in the USSR.- 51 -
4.4. Differentiating the Wage Structure
Labour market regulations and wage setting raise specific issues
of transition. The application of West German labour market
regulations (lay-off constraints) affects the process of
transition including investment. Thus, article 613a of the West
German Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch) requires that
existing labour contracts also hold for the new owner of a firm.
This rule is intended to protect the employee against a lay-off
in a normal ownership change, and it already establishes
incentives not to buy a firm under a normal situation. However,
this rule creates severe incentive problems for the transition of
a socialist economy, especially in privatizing firms. Other
institutional features of the German labour market are the
bargaining autonomy of trade unions and employers' associations
(Tarifhoheit), the mandatory application of bargained wages to
non-union labour (Allgemeinverbindlichkeit), severance pay for
closing a firm and the social security system. West German
unemployment compensation was extended to Eastern Germany with
the compensation being linked to the East German wage level.
With the exchange rate no longer available to improve the
competitiveness of East German firms, the wage rate should take
over the function of giving Eastern Germany a temporary
advantage. However, one has to recognize some mechanisms that
reduce the wage differential between East and West Germany. Since
highly skilled workers are rather mobile, their wages cannot
differ too much between Eastern and Western Germany. Commuters
along the previous border will raise wages in the western parts- 52 -
of the former GDR; this also holds for Berlin. Firms in the
service sector in Eastern Germany, such a banks and insurance
companies, seem to pay the same wage to employees regardless of
whether they come from Eastern Germany or Western Germany.
Converting wages with a rate of 1:1 did not improve the
competitiveness of East German firms. More specifically, the
conversion rate formed expectations of the East German
population.
Trade unions have pushed for high wage increases. Bargaining of
trade unions was undertaken in a situation when firms were not
yet privatized and the previous managers were still in place.
Thus, the trade unions did not have a strong counterpart.
Moreover, for the managers and workers wage bargaining represents
an end game (Akerloff 1991 et al), with many of them losing their
job. In addition, it could reasonably be expected that the
government or the social security system would protect against
unemployment with compensation being linked to the wage rate
agreed upon. Last but not least, there was no attempt of
government policy to control the wage increases (compare Poland's
tax policy).
In the third quarter of 1990, the average wage per employee in
Eastern German industry has increased by 14% amounting to an
annual rate of nearly 70 %; at the end of 1990, Eastern Germany
has reached roughly 50 % of the West German wage level ' whereas
productivity, estimated by some to be 1/3 of the West German
level of productivity prior to the currency union (Siebert
1990a), is now calculated as 28.5 % of West Germany's for the- 53 -
second half of 1990 (Statistisches Bundesamt 1991b). It is
estimated that at the end of 1991, the East German wage level
will be at 60 % of the Western German level.
A favourable labour endowment at low wages provides only a
temporary comparative advantage for Eastern Germany. However, it
should be recognized that the ex-GDR has a qualified stock of
labour, which implies a comparative advantage in skilled-labour
products. Moreover, we can expect that the addition of labour to
the West German economcy will eventually imply a somewhat lower
wage increase in the united Germany.
There seem to be three conflicting demands on the role of the
wage rate in East Germany. First, the wage rate should take over
the role of the exchange rate because the competitiveness of
firms is heavily influenced by the wage rate. Second, the wage
rate should be in line with the increase in labour productivity.
Third, the wage rate should be high enough to keep people from
emigrating. This may be too much of a task for one price
variable.
The answer to this puzzle of conflicting demands on the wage rate
is that the productivity rule should dominate. Then,
competitiveness is assured and the role of wages analogous to the
exchange rate is fulfilled. Wages increase with the rise in
productivity. Moreover, highly qualified labour will be able to
earn high wages in East Germany. Emigration and commuting is not
bad in itself, because it can be considered to be a
training-on-the job which is probably more efficient than any- 54 -
governmental qualification program. Moreover, in the spring of
1991 emigration is not an issue and unemployment may be a more
important determinant of migration than the wage rate. The
productivity rule implies a differentiation in the wage structure
and decentralized labour contracts. Wages for a highly qualified
expert in East and West Germany cannot be too different and wages
for any kind of qualification cannot be too divergent in East and
West Berlin or along the previous border. But wages for work in
Gorlitz near the Polish border and East Berlin might very well be
different. Thus, one important answer to the unemployment problem
is wage differentation. Wage setting should follow the
productivity rule.
4.5. Causal Therapy versus Neutralisation Policy
Besides ownership uncertainty, there are specific bottlenecks
which hinder a quick development. One such bottleneck is the
non-existence of an efficient administration especially in the
heavily regulated German economy. Insufficent records of land
titles are one example. In the German case, the regulations of a
well developed market economy are applied to an economy in
transition, for instance the licencing procedure for firms
(licence to open a business, environmental licences etc.), land
use planning, zoning and the procedures of land use for
infrastructure. The decision process on large scale
infrastructure projects such as new railroad lines or major roads
takes 15 - 20 years.- 55 -
Infrastructure, an important prerequisite for private activity,
is deficient in Eastern Germany. This holds for communication,
transportation such as railways and roads as well as
environmental quality. In Germany, infrastructure in these areas
has traditionally been a domain of government which implies that
the provision of new infrastructure is subject to the relatively
slow decision process of government, to the specific constraints
of governments for instance in hiring personnel and due to the
budgetary process as well as to budget constraints.
Unfortunately, the political process is not imaginative enough to
introduce the private provision of infrastructure and private
funding.
Lacking premises being relevant for the creation of new firms is
another bottleneck. Access to premises is linked to the
uncertainty of ownership, to the not yet efficient administration
and to the deficiency in infrastructure, for instance with
respect to industrial parks, energy supply for specific locations
or the capacity of the water purification system and sewage
pipes. Moreover, old firms block location space for new firms.
We have competing hypotheses for explaining the falling branch of
the J-curve of output. Here is a review of the candidates for
explanations:
i) The existing firms are inefficient.- 56 -
ii) Ownership uncertainty blocks investment in the restructuring
of old as well as in the creation of new firms.
iii) The inefficiency of the administration and the lacking
infrastructure represent a further bottleneck.
iv) The appreciation of the East German Mark has reduced the
competitiveness of East German firms.
v) Wages have increased at a higher rate than productivity
contributing to unemployment.
vi) The supply side response of restructuring existing and
creating new firms requires time.
All these factors are relevant in explaining the adjustment
problem. We would need an econometric analysis enabling us to
discriminate between the different causes. In my evaluation, the
inefficiency of the typical firm is the basic initial condition
of the problem; this, however, is given. Similarily as the
currency union is given and cannot be changed. Also, the
adjustment time needed for a supply side response is a fact. The
major cause of the adjustment problem that can be changed by
policy is ownership uncertainty. For second rank, the
inefficiency of the administration and the lacking infrastructure
compete with the wage policy.
A policy of transition in the sense of a causal therapy is the
most promising approach. Therefore, the first line of attack must- 57 -
be eliminating ownership uncertainty, improving the
administrative facilities, exempting Eastern Germany from some of
the West German regulations and improving the infrastructure. The
political process may be pressed, however, to do more and
neutralize some of the causes. This involves the risk of
perpetuating the inefficiences and creating new distortions. This
is the area of second best. Unfortunately, the theory of the
second best very often does not incorporate the political economy
of instruments chosen and therefore is not too relevant for
practical problems. Some of the policy approaches are shortly
reviewed.
Subsidies to existing firms. Subsidizing non-viable firms in
order to protect the workers during the transition period
definitely is the wrong approach. Subsidies would protect the
inefficient firm, and this would severely retard adjustment.
Economic decisions such as the closing of firms would be
politicized and subsidies would be perpetuated in the political
process. Rent seeking would be an attractive activity for
management. Moreover, the exit conditions for the old firms
influence the entry conditions for new firms: subsidized firms
define the wage level of a region and block the location space
for new firms. Finally, financial resources used for the old
firms compete with the stimulation of new firms due to the budget
contraint of government.
Wage subsidies. Subsidizing labour (Akerloff et al 1991) would
reduce the wage costs of firms. It would not make sense to grant
wage subsidies only to non-viable firms, consequently a general- 58 -
wage subsidy for all firms, old and new would be required. The
financial burden of such a general wage subsidy is large:
Consider a subsidy of 300 DM per month (20 % of the average
monthly wage) and take into account 8.5 mn employees, this would
require 30 bn DM. Admittedly, there would be less expenditures on
unemployment. Another argument against wage subsidies is that
they do not grant a premium on change and a new orientation for
the future, but keep up the status quo. The most severe problem,
however, is the moral hazard behaviour of trade unions. In a
situation of high aspiration levels of the East German
population, with the employer's side not effectively represented
in the bargaining process and with the German unemployment system
it is difficult to see how wage subsidies would not quickly find
their way into higher wages. Wage subsidies clearly would be a
serious mistake. A rather practical problem is that the
investment subsidies already in place must be considered as given
(changing them now would not be wise). Consequently, wage
subsidies would be added to investment subsidies '.
Protecting the workers. Clearly, workers laid off during the
transition must be protected. In principle, this could have been
accomplished by applying the unemployment insurance to Eastern
Germany and adjusting it to the new situation. Instead, a
short-term work arrangement paying 68 % of the previous wage
(plus an additional 22 % by the firm thus amounting to 90 % of
the previous wage) was introduced as a mechanism to protect the
workers. The short-term work arrangement has been extended to the
end of 1991; the additional payment by firms - a result of wage- 59 -
bargaining - is under discussion after the first half of 1991. It
is better to protect the worker than inefficient firms.
Qualification schemes. Short-term work arrangements have the
advantage of protecting the worker (and reducing the wage costs
for firms considerably), but they have a rather static
orientation. The incentive for qualification was weak. Therefore
qualification schemes may be a promising avenue. West German
experience with so called "employment firms" run by
municipalities and non profit organizations do not seem to be too
encouraging. However, it might be more promising to initiate a
decentralized supply of qualification opportunities by private
industry. This could be achieved by giving any unemployed person
a qualification voucher containing the unemployment insurance
plus a coupon which can be handed in to any firm that is
registered as a qualification firm (for details Siebert 1991a).
Investment subsidies. Subsidizing investment favours capital and
this distorts resource allocation. In increasing capital
intensity, it is an incentive to substitute labour by capital,
and this reduces the demand for labour. In the sense of a causal
therapy, investment subsidies cannot overcome ownership
uncertainty and hardly an inefficient administration.
Nevertheless, investment subsidies are oriented towards change
and may start the accumulation scenario. It seems that a
combination of investment subsidies and qualification schemes is
the most promising approach. Both approaches do not protect the- 60 -
economic structures of the past, but they put a premium on
something new.
German economic policy has opted for a combination of protecting
the worker and a complex system of investment stimulation. Firms
can collect an investment tax-credit (bonus) for investment in
machinery and equipment of 12 % (up to December 1991), 8 % (up to
December 1992) and subsidies of up to 23 % of investment outlays
according to the federal-states programm "Improving the regional
economic structure", however by application. In addition to the
tax credit, special depreciation allowances of up to 50 % in the
first five years can be applied. For investment in machinery and
equipment, all these subsidies can be used in addition to a
linear depreciation of investment expenditure in the first year.
In many cases, this is equivalent to a 100 % depreciation. There
are special programmes for new and small firms. These measures
have been critized by the Council of Economic Advisors as being
too confusing. A general investment tax credit would have been
preferable. It seems to be quite clear that in the sense of a
causal therapy a lack of investment incentives is not the
decisive factor for the slow development in Eastern Germany.
4.6. The Market versus Structural Policy
The decisive policy choice is to what extent real adjustment in
Eastern Germany will come about through market forces or by the
political process. There is a strong political demand for the- 61 -
structural protection of the East German industry, for a slowed
adjustment process and other types of intervention protecting the
existing firms. This would imply subsidizing the inefficient
firms, postponing the closure of non-viable firms and keeping
them under the umbrella of government. As a consequence, there is
a definite risk that the political process will dominate the
privatization of firms and that privatization will not be decided
upon economic criteria but in the political process. Treuhand
will be pushed to make firms viable first and then to privatize
them. Finally, there is a tendency that the increase in wages is
not steered by market forces, especially by the increase in
productivity, but by political bargaining.
Two reasons can be cited for these risks. First, the aspirations
of the inhabitants of Eastern Germany are high, resulting in a
political demand for quick improvements in income, environmental
quality, housing, social security and physical infrastructure.
The demonstration effect of the rich brother in Western Germany
forms the expectations and the aspiration levels of the
population in Eastern Germany. In this respect, the situation
differs from 1948 in Western Germany. Second, there is now a
spreading belief that the restructuring of Eastern Germany cannot
be left to the market forces, and that politicians have to
intervene. Market processes on the supply side like stimulating
new supply, creating new products, investing into new production
lines need time, but people do not have patience. Moreover, in a
situation with impatience of the electorate, the politician is
tempted to intervene, thus arousing public support and aiming at
the acknowledgement of his legitimacy. This discretionary- 62 -
behaviour having been labelled the firefighter approach is
characterized by a short-run perspective, attempting a quick fix
to solutions without taking into account long term opportunity
costs.
If the political demands for an institutional approach to the
restructuring of the East German economy are allowed to influence
the course of events and if they dominate the market process,
economic decisions will be politicized. Then, some of the
characteristics of the previous inefficient system will continue.
The firms will face a soft budget constraint as before and the
necessary adjustment will not come about. The government will
take over the role of evaluating the potential development of
sectors and firms which it clearly cannot do. The existing
inefficiency of the East German economy will be perpetuated, and
structural change in the ex-GDR will take place along similar
lines to West Germany's experience with the sectoral policy for
ailing industries. The forecast then is that financial resources
will be wasted, that the burden for the taxpayer will be high and
that the positive supply side effect will be severely inhibited.
In a special report, the German Council of Economic Advisors
(Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung 1991) has warned against such an approach to the
problems in Eastern Germany.- 63 -
5. Long-Run Benefits versus the Costs of Unification; Budget
Policy and the External Account
In the medium and in the long run, the integration effect, the
impact of the new economic system and the capital accumulation
effect will play, and there will be the long-run benefits from
unification for Germany. In the transition period, costs are
incurred, and as in any large-scale investment project, there is
a cash-sink hole before the gains come in. Besides this
intertemporal asymmetry in expenditures and receipts, there is
the issue to what extent transfers are needed to smooth the
process of transition and to alleviate the social problems in
Eastern Germany.
5.1. Diverging Macroeconomic Conditions
In the transition period, there are diverging macroeconomic
conditions between Eastern and Western Germany. In West Germany,
real GNP has increased by 4.6 % in 1990, whereas GNP in Eastern
Germany has fallen by about 15 %. Aggregate demand for West
German products has increased, creating excess demand and
inflationary pressure in the West. It is estimated that East
German demand has contributed one percentage point to the real
growth rate in Western Germany in 1990 (and may contribute an
additional half percentage point in 1991). In the last years of
high capacity utilization with almost 100 %, production capacity
proved to be elastic, possibly due to the immigration from the
ex-GDR and Eastern Europe. Due to a lack of demand for East- 64 -
German goods, we have a structural crisis in the East reflecting
the transition from a socialist system to a market economy. An
indication of the split macroeconomic situation can be seen in
the three variables industrial production, retail sales and the
























 b Not Seasonally adjusted
Sourcn: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberlcht, various Issues.- 66 -
5.2. Transfers
In Eastern Germany there is a difference between production and
absorption. In the second half of 1990, absorption of 143,190 bn
DM was higher by 37,890 bn DM than production (105,3 bn DM). For
1991, a difference between absorption and production of 110 bn
DM can be expected (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 1991). This difference,
socially easing the process of transition, can only be explained
by explict or implicit transfers to Eastern Germany. Governmental
transfers (federal government, states) amounted to 45 bn. DM in
1990; in addition, the conversion of the East German Mark has
given purchasing power to East Germans '. Income of commuters
earned in Western Germany is another factor. In Western Germany
the growth rate of GDP is greater than that of GNP, due to
commuters from Eastern Germany. For 1991, government transfers
are estimated to reach 115 bn. DM (see Table 6).
Government transfers from Western Germany are needed for
financing most of the expenditures of the new Bundeslander and
the local governments in the East. Government revenue in the East
will be low mainly relying on the value-added tax and on excise
taxes. Expenditures will be necessary not only for the
government's administrative role but also for building up
infrastruture and improving the environmental situation. In
addition there is the risk that massive subsidies will be paid in
order to alleviate structural problems from a lack of
competitiveness of industry and agriculture.- 67 -
It is extremely difficult to estimate the amount of future
government expenditures and transfers. For social overhead
capital, the back-bf-the-envelope calculation of the GDR capital
stock in infrastructure amounts to roughly DM 530 bn. This figure
can be derived by adjusting the West German capital stock in
infrastructure of 2,044 bn. DM according to the proportion of the
g
population in Eastern Germany of 25 % (Siebert 1990c, Table 5).
Assuming that part of the infrastructure (buildings, roads) is
physically intact, maybe 300 bn. DM will have to be spent on
physical infrastructure over a ten-year period. It is even more
difficult to estimate the costs of correcting the environmental
damages of the past. These costs are not included in this
calculation. Note that costs for abatement of new facilities must
be borne by the individual firms and therefore do not represent a
cause of public transfer.
Part of the transfers to Eastern Germany stem from the "German
Unity Fund" (22 bn. DM in 1990, 35 bn. DM in 1991). The fund was
built in May 1990. The federal government finances about 10 % of
the means of the fund directly; the rest of the burden is shared
by the states (Lander) including the local governments and the
federal government (50 % each). The fund's means were intended to
finance public expenditures at all levels of government in
Eastern Germany. In February it was decided that the means are
used to finance expenditures of the local governments and the
states only; this means an additional 5 bn. transfer to the new
Lander and the municipalities in Eastern Germany. Also,- 68 -
in February 1991, a new programme "Reconstruction of Eastern
Germany", was started. It includes 12 bn. DM mainly for building
up the infrastructure of the new states; substantial labour
market policy measures are intended, too.
Contrary to the 1990 intentions, the new Lander will receive
their share in the value added tax revenues according to the size
of the population already in 1991 instead of 1994. This means a
transfer of 6 bn. DM from Western Germany to Eastern Germany.
Nevertheless, the new states do not yet fully participate in the
traditional West German transfer mechanism that shifts tax
revenues from rich states to the poor ones. According to the 1990
plans, the new states would only have been included in this
transfer process in 1995. However, this will probably happen
earlier because of strong pressure from the new states.
Explicit transfers to the new Lander and municipalities do not
represent the only item explaining transfers to Eastern Germany.
The social security system in the transitional period has to be
financed, and this represents a transfer to East Germans. It is
estimated that 7 bn. DM were necessary for the initial financing
of the social security system (mainly old age pensions, benefits
in case of unemployment or short-time work) in 1990. Another item
are the financial needs of the Treuhand. In this context, the
financial status of Treuhand is not yet known (see above).
Moreover, the previous GDR banking system and its successors have
so-called "equalization claims" (Ausgleichsforderungen) against a
special fund (Ausgleichsfonds-Wahrungsumstellung) on their asset- 69 -
side. These claims arose when the assets and liabilities (savings
of the population) of the GDR banking system were converted at
different rates. Equalization claims amount to 24 bn DM according
to preliminary calculations. In 1991, interest of about 2 bn. DM
is paid by a special fund of the federal government.- 70 -
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(a) Public sector in the definition of National Income and Product
Accounts (including the social security system and the
Treuhandanstalt
Source: Own calculations based on DIW [ 1991a]
A special fund of the federal government also has taken over foreign
debt of the ex-GDR amounting to 16 - 17 bn. DM. This represents a
yearly burden of roughly DM 1.5 bn. In addition, the federal
government will incur other expenditures for Eastern Germany, for
instance for building up the infrastructure without explicitly
transferring the funds to the new Lander. These expenditures of the
federal government are included in the figures of Table 5. For the
financing of the long-run sales contracts to the USSR, more than DM 2
bn. were paid in 1990, a similar burden can be expected for 1991.
The East German budget for 1990 (ex-GDR until October 3, since
October 3 new Lander, local governments, fictitious part of the
central government, social security, Treuhandanstalt) included expen-
ditures of DM 157 bn. and government revenues of DM 128 bn. Among the- 71 -
revenues, transfers from Western Germany amounted to DM 45 bn in
1990. The Eastern German budget deficit was DM 29 bn in 1990. For
1991, expenditures are estimated at 262 bn DM and revenues at 212 bn
DM, transfers will be 115 bn DM; the Eastern German budget deficit is
50 bn DM. (Table 5).- 72 -
Table 6 - Government Transfers from West to East Germany, 1990 and 1991
(bn. DM)
1990 1991
Transfers to the social security system
Old age pension scheme
Unemployment insurance
Health insurance











Table 7 : Government Budget (a) - bn. DM
115


































Balance - 80 - 145
(a) Public sector in the definition of the National Income
and Product Accounts (including the social security system
and the Treuhandanstalt)
Source: Boss (1990); corrected according to new information.- 73 -
5.3. The Overall Budget Deficit
The overall German government budget deficit amounted to 80 bn. DM in
1990, which is 3 % of GNP (Table 8). In May 1991, a budget deficit of
140 bn. - 150 bn. DM (5.1 % of GNP) is expected for 1991. A
comparable budget deficit existed in 1975 (5.6 %; 1981: 3.7 %). From
1981, this ratio was brought down to 2.1 % in 1988. In 1989 there was
even a small budget surplus (0.2 %).

















































Source: Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1990),
own calculations for the Federal Republic of Germany.- 74 -
In principle, public investment can be financed by bonds and a
temporary budget deficit may not be a matter of concern. This holds
if investment pays for itself. In the German case, however, it is
estimated that out of the transfer of 115 bn DM (1991) only 15 %
represent infrastructure investment per se; even if establishing an
efficient administration could be considered as an investment, the
overwhelming part of transfer is for consumption. Thus, in an
investment sense, a large part of the transfer will not generate
future tax revenues.
Another aspect of a deficit is that the source of financing
government expenditures including consumption expenditures, i.e. by
taxes or bonds, may be irrelevant, if individuals fully anticipate
future tax obligations implied by government debt and increase their
9) savings accordingly. ' Under the assumptions of Ricardian equivalence
(Barro 1979) like non-distortionary taxes, operational bequest
motives and no credit rationing for individuals intertemporal
distortions could be minimized by setting taxes and debt finance in
such a mix that the expected future tax rates are constant. A
temporary expenditure could then be financed by a small increase in
taxes. It is open whether Ricardian equivalence holds empirically
(Nicoletti 1988) but it is still another question to what extent a
government is well advised to base its fiscal policy on the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem.
A third aspect of allowing deficits is that the political process
will not control expenditures sufficiently (especially before
elections) and that the dynamics of the political process will go on
a spending spree. Neutrality of financing is destroyed by the- 75 -
political economy of government expenditure, and historical
experience of democracies including institutional and even
constitutional rules in the expenditure behaviour of governments
suggests that this aspect cannot be neglected. (Buchanan and Tullock
1962). Under this aspect, the size of the deficit matters; bond
financing of a budget deficit of 5 % is not advisable.
An additional argument is that a deficit of this size would reduce
the political manoeuvering space of future governments considerably
due to heavy interest payments. Governments may be forced to increase
taxes in order to repay debt thus choking off private investment. Or
consider a scenario in which a country has to devalue its currency
for reasons it cannot control. Such a devaluation may put pressure on
monetary policy. If a high external debt is around, this may
aggrevate the problem. Thus, a large budget deficit reflects a risk
factor if unforeseen developments occur. The policy conclusion is
that the deficit has to be brought down.
Part of the financial burden on the German budget should have been
financed by a reshuffling and reduction of expenditures including the
cutting of subsidies. Expenditures in the overall budget amount to
1,212 bn. DM (1990), and it should have been possible to reduce (and
stretch) at least some of the expenditures. Subsidies are estimated
for West Germany alone at 130 bn. DM per year (explicit payments 80
bn. DM) , and it should have been possible to cut 20 % or 26 bn. DM.
Especially, the former border areas of West Germany and Berlin were
subsidized with 13 bn. annually, and these subsidies now represent
severe distortions relative to the new Lander. However, the political- 76 -
process does not have enough vigour to reduce expenditures only
succeeding in cutting 2 bn. DM 1991, as the program of the new
coalition government indicates. Only in 1994, the subsidies are to be
reduced by 10 bn. DM, mainly because of the abolition of the
subsidies for Berlin and the former border areas. Additional efforts
to cut subsidies were announced by the Minister of Economic Affairs
in early March 1991.
Financing government expenditures by partly privatizing
infrastructure in Eastern Germany was never seriously taken up. This
option would have had the additional advantage of providing
infrastructure much more quickly than through the budgetary process.
The communication industry could have been privatized, financing
itself through user charges. Financing through user charges could
also have been applied to airports, other areas of transportation,
and industrial parks and local environmental projects like water
purification plants. In these cases, the government would only have
to set the frame of reference under which private projects can be
undertaken.
Another source of financing would have been the sale of governmental
assets in West Germany where some firms are still owned by the
federal government, but a large number by the states and the
municipalities, especially in the savings and loans sector. The
revenue potential from privatization in Western Germany is
substantial. In 1989 the financial assets held by the government
amounted to 370 bn. DM (Schlesinger 1990).- 77 -
An important issue for the future is the division of labour among the
federal government, the states and the towns and counties with
respect to public expenditure and revenue. In the long run, a new
system of intergovernmental transfers (Finanzausgleich) will have to
be developed for Germany with new rules for allocating government
income and expenditure to the three layers of government, the central
government, the states (Lander) and the municipalities. In the actual
system, the states only have a minor authority in determining their
revenue. More autonomy on the revenue side, and consequently on the
expenditure side, could be introduced by letting states explicitly
decide on tax rates, for instance with a state-specific income tax
rule. This would introduce a process of institutional competition
among states both on the expenditure as well as the revenue side. A
precondition for such an approach would be a redefinition of states
so that they are viable.
5.4. Interest Rate Effect
From the long-run effect of integration, from new investment
opportunities and from the incentives of the market system, German
union can be interpreted as a "new frontier" in the sense of Alvin
Hansen (1955) or as a positive supply shock. Clearly, the potential
marginal efficiency of capital in Eastern Germany has increased, and
the real interest rate will be driven up from the supply side. Due to
a higher marginal efficiency of private investment, demand for
capital increases. This supply shock effect is operating in the real
economy.- 78 -
A way to view the supply shock effect on the interest rate is a shift
in the marginal productivity curve of one country in a two-country
diagram (Figure 2, Siebert 1990c) or a shift in the factor price
frontier defining the maximum possible real factor prices. Similar to
the production possibility set of an economy, the factor price
frontier is also affected by the institutional arrangement of an
economy as a third factor of production operating in the background.
With the given technology and capital in place, the transition to the
market economy makes the existing capital stock obsolete, for
instance by changing the price for energy and the environment. The
factor price frontier shifts to the left (arrow 1 in Figure 7). New
technology and new capital will shift the factor price frontier to
right implying a higher marginal productivity of capital and/or of
labour. Moving from P to P'', implies a higher real interest rate and
allows at the same time a higher wage rate. Note that the movement
from P to P' corresponds to the J-curve effect.- 79 -
FIGURE 7: The Factor Price Frontier
N p'- 80 -
In addition to the supply shock effect for private capital, there is
a supply side effect on the interest rate from infrastructure
capital. With the infrastructure capital in Eastern Germany being
inefficient, it "pays" to improve it, that is, infrastructure has a
high marginal productivity.
The supply shock rise of the real interest rate will be influenced by
the availability of capital. In an open economy, capital inflows
reduce the tendency of the interest rate to rise. To what extend the
supply shock can operate, will also depend on the institutional
arrangement of financing infrastructure, for instance whether it is
financed privately, by bonds or by taxation. In addition, government
demand for capital is not only caused by spending on infrastruture,
but by other areas of spending leading to a deficit. Thus, the
interest rate will be driven up by a budget deficit, and the supply
shock effect and government behaviour of spending may be difficult to
be separated. Finally, the interest rate observed may reflect
inflationary and currency expectations.
The data show an increase in the nominal long-term interest rate (on
Government bonds) in Germany from below 7 % in the middle of 1989 to
around 9 % after the announcement on the German monetary union on
February 7, 1990. The nominal interest rate has remained on that
level (until of January 1991 coming half a percentage down in
February; Siebert, 1991c, Figure 7). The real long-term interest rate
defined as the difference between the nominal interest rate on
government bonds and the rate of change of the consumer price index,
i.e. the ex-post real interest rate, rose from below 4 % (August
19 89) to a range between 6 and 7 (October 1989 to March 1990; June to- 81 -
October 1990 and January to February 1991; see Figure 8). Statistical
analysis would be required to discriminate against other determinants
of the real interest rate such as the business cycle situation in
order to isolate the impact of German unification.- 82 -
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5.5. Fiscal Expansion versus Monetary Restraint
The transitional period will be characterized by expansionary fiscal
policy. With transfers being largely financed by bonds, there is
pressure for the interest rate to rise from the demand side in
addition to a supply shock increase in the rate of return. If the
Bundesbank sticks strictly to a monetary expansion according to the
increase in production capacity, irrespective of the behaviour of
other players in the arena of stabilization policy such as fiscal
policy and the trade unions, the non-inflationary rate-of-output
growth is realized by the interest rate: The interest rate rises and
chokes off demand that might otherwise affect the price level. In
addition, if the price level rises, the real supply of money is
reduced implying again an increase in the interest rate.
An alternative view is that the Bundesbank also takes into account
the behaviour of the other players, i.e. of the fiscal policy and the
trade unions. In such a context, an expansionary fiscal policy limits
the manoeuvering space for the Bundesbank in the future, and monetary
policy may very well have to be restrictive in order to maintain
price level stability. Thus, the economic policy situation is similar
to the early 1980s in the United States, and we may see a conflict
between an expansionary fiscal policy and monetary restraint. In
addition, high wage demands by the trade unions as in Western Germany
in early 1991 may aggrevate the situation and may induce the
Bundesbank to pursue a stricter monetary policy. Note that the two
explanations of the behaviour of the Bundesbank clearly show the
advantage of sticking to a rule , i.e. commitment, and thus- 84 -
establishing credibility. Sticking to a rule excludes strategic
behaviour of other players and moral hazard problems.
5.6. The Exchange Rate
From the supply side, there should be an appreciation of the D-Mark
of post-wall Germany (Burda 1990, Lehment 1990). This appreciation
can be motivated both from the capital account and the current
account. From the capital account, the appreciation of the D-Mark is
due to a higher marginal efficiency of capital, i.e. higher rates of
return in Eastern Germany, to a larger capital inflow (reduced
capital outflow out of the D-Mark area) and consequently to an
increased demand for the D-Mark. From the trade account, the
appreciation is a vehicle to bring about a reduction in the overall
German trade surplus. This reduction is necessary because East
Germany has a trade deficit thus reducing the overall German trade
surplus. In 1990, the German current account surplus was 32,1 bn. DM
lower than 1989. Of course, the appreciation of the D-Mark as shown
in Figure 9 cannot only be explained by the German unification but is
also due to other factors, for instance in the US or in the Soviet
Union with political instability in the Soviet Union implying a
depreciation of the DM. Moreover, it is open to what extent the
appreciation had already been anticipated by the future market in
1990.- 85 -
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In a world of tradeables and non-tradeables, the real exchange rate
wR _ wpT /PNT will appreciate as well. In such a context the price
for tradeables(pT) will be given by the world market. The price for
non-tradeables (PNT) will rise for a number of reasons: The income
transfer to East Germany will increase the demand for non-tradeables,
supply-side growth will lead to an increase in income, again raising
the demand for non-tradeables, and infrastructure outlays in East
Germany will increase the demand for non-tradeables. All these forces
will raise demand for non-tradeables. Consequently, the price of
non-tradeables will increase from the demand side. On the cost side,
wages and production costs will rise. Moreover, price controls on
non-tradeables will be lifted. At the same time, the transformation
function between tradeables and non-tradeables will shift upward due
to productivity gains and capital inflow. The bias in the shift in
the transformation curve between tradeables and non-tradeables will
influence the opportunity costs of producing non-tradeables. This
supply-side effect may counteract the impact of the increase in
demand on the relative price of non-tradeables. It is sufficient for
an increase in the opportunity costs of non-tradeables if the shift
in the transformation function is neutral or if it is biased in
favour of tradeables. Then the price of non-tradeables would rise
from the production side. Under this condition, the relative price
between non-tradeables and tradeables (p /pT) rises, implying an
appreciation of the real exchange rate.
The caveat on the role structural policy requires a caveat on the
hypothesis of the appreciation of the DM. If an explicit structural
policy with subsidies dominates the adjustment process, the
inefficiencies of the old planning system will be perpetuated and the- 87 -
rise in the marginal efficiency in Eastern Germany is limited.
Subsidies put a burden on the governmental budget and increase debt,
or taxes have to be raised. This outcome of a depreciation is
stressed by Wyplosz (1991) and Melitz (1991) who come to the
conclusion that the real exchange rate will depreciate, at least in
the long run. The argument is that in the transitional period
investment in Eastern Germany will be financed from capital inflows,
and Germany will accumulate foreign debt; in the long run, debt has
to be repaid, requiring a real depreciation to generate a surplus in
the current
;account. According to this scenario, Germany would repeat
the story of the US in the eighties, with an investment boom,
financed by foreign debt, and a transitional appreciation which is
corrected later on. Even if German unification is not financed by
foreign debt, the intertemporal mechanism of stocks is operating:
With a reduced current account, the stock of foreign direct
investment and of portfolio investment by Germans is reduced, and
consequently, the tendency of appreciation for the Deutsche Mark is
weakened.
The depreciation of the DM hinges, however, very much on the
assumption that the West German production function will be relevant
for the united Germany, but it neglects the integration gains and the
embodiment effect of new technoloy through investment in Eastern
Germany. These phenomena change the German macro-economic production
function (see Baldwin 1989, Romer 1986). The hypothesis of the
embodiment effect of new technical knowledge indicates that Eastern
Germany has a chance to incorporate a more modern technology than
Western Germany and can thus enjoy the advantage of a latecomer.
Moreover, economic integration can increase variety and product- 88 -
quality and can thus stimulate exports in areas of inelastic
international demand preventing negative terms of trade effect. Under
these conditions, there will be a dynamic supply side effect over
time counterbalancing the stock effect of a lower German capital
accumulation abroad and not necessarily implying a long-run
depreciation (unless counterbalanced by structural policy).
German unification represents a shock to a specific country of the
EMS mechanism. This is the typical case of an advantage of flexible
exchange rates, i.e. the case of a realignment. Thus, a long-run
tendency for an appreciation of the D-Mark will put pressure on the
EMS for a realignment. Without realignment, the EMS countries will
experience an increase in the interest rate. This pressure for
realignment will arise from the forces in the real economy such as
supply-side growth, increased internal absorption and capital inflow
into Germany. In addition, the ECU will be pulled up by the DM and
thus can be expected to appreciate against the Dollar area, thereby
reducing the competitiveness of ECU-area exports to the non-ECU
currency area.
5.7. Brakesman versus Locomotive
The rise in the interest rate spreading to other countries is seen as
a burden to these countries, and Germany is viewed as the brakesman
of economic development elsewhere. There is no doubt, that higher- 89 -
interest rates in Germany negatively affect investment elsewhere.
From the point of view of gross national product of a country,
however, lending capital abroad, means that a country's capital
owners earn a higher income in Germany. With capital income no longer
being limited to a specific group of society, these benefits can be
widely spread.
But the increase in the interest rate is only part of the story. At
the same time, there is an increase in import demand. In July -
December 1990, German imports have increased by 14,4 % (constant 1980
prices), whereas exports stagnated (Table A5). Exports of France
(13,6 %) Italy (19,5 %) and the Centrally Planned Economies (17 %)
have increased considerably in nominal terms, and it is estimated
that German economic growth has added half a percentage point to the
GNP growth rate of the E.C. in 1990. From the current account,
Germany plays the role of a locomotive. The conflicting view of
brakesman versus locomotive stressed in the policy debate of
international macroeconomics is misleading because the current
account and the capital account are determined simultaneously by the
same decisions. The net impact of the role of the brakesman and the
role of the locomotive on a specific country will depend on the
specific conditions in the neighbouring country. For instance, a
country with a high foreign or a high government debt (Italy) and a
low competitiveness of its exports (USA) may profit less or even be
negatively affected. On average, we should, however, expect, that a
positive supply shock in one country will have positive spillovers
for the world economy as a whole.- 90 -
6. Two Alternative Scenarios for the Future; Mezzogiornio versus the
New Frontier
There are two conflicting economic scenarios for the united Germany:
the Mezzogiornio versus the new frontier. In the worst case, politics
can be characterized by the firefighter approach basically following
an interventionistic route. According to this scenario, political
pressure will be so strong that the existing inefficient firms will
be subsidized supposedly in order to protect people. Such an approach
of "Staatswirtschaft" will perpetuate the inefficiency of the East
German economy; it will miss a chance to modernize its technology and
to bring the obsolete capital stock up to date. This will be a severe
drain on German resources, and Germany will be carrying a financial
burden around its neck affecting the manoeuvring space of fiscal
policy in the future. Moreover, a goal conflict between fiscal
expansion and monetary stability is in the cards. In such a scenario,
the drain on resources - Eastern Germany being a barrel without a
bottom - will be translated by the international finance markets into
a weak DM making monetary stability much more difficult.
The alternative scenario is that an interventionistic approach can be
prevented and that the medium run and the long run positive effects
of German unification will prevail after the important bottlenecks of
ownership uncertainty and a deficient administration in Eastern
Germany have been overcome. In this interpretation, German
unification represents a new frontier, an investment opportunity or
in Schumpeter's terms a case of "creative destruction". Integration
gains, the new economic system and capital accumulation will play- 91 -
their role. I personally believe this will be the relevant scenario
for the future. Barring serious political mistakes as in structural
policy, the economic integration of the two Germanies will be a
growth stimulus for both Germanies, for Europe and for the world
economy. With the German trade surplus being reduced in the
transition period, Germany's demand for other countries' exports will
increase. Europe, the United States and other countries will
experience an increase in the demand for their exportables and will
thus benefit from the German unification.
The case of Eastern Germany can be considered as a specific case in
the transition of a socialist economy to a market economy in which
the institutional infrastructure and the monetary system were
provided externally and in which the adjustment of the real economy
is the only remaining decisive issue. The transition of Eastern
Germany thus can be considered as a laboratory experiment of real
adjustment which is still to come for Eastern Europe (Siebert, et.
al. 1991). Establishing the institutional infrastructure and creating
monetary stability are additional problems to be solved in Eastern
Europe. Some specific constraints of the German case such as high
labour mobility, orienting the aspirations level to the West German
standard and not having the exchange rate as a shock absorber do not
hold for Eastern European countries, but these countries face
different financial restraints with debt as a burden to start with
and a lower possibility of attracting foreign investment.- 92 -
Appendix
Table Al - Structure of Employment by Sectors in East Germany and West Ger-
many, 1989
















































































































































(a) Data for 1987. - (b) Calculated for total employment of 1987, i.e. 17,050.-
(c) Latest available data of 1988. - (c) Calculated for total employment
i.e. 27,249 - (e) This figure does not take into account apprentices
prentices. Including them would raise the number of total employment by 353,000.
Source: DIW [1990a]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik [1989];
Statistisches Bundesamt [1989a]; own calculations.- 93 -















































(a) - Including East Berlin. - (b) 2nd half of 1990. - (c)





























































































Source: Gemeinsames Statistisches Amt der fvinf neuen Bundeslander (1990); Deutsche Bundesbank (1990);
Statistisches Bundesamt (1991).- 94 -
Table A3: GNP and GDP of Eastern (a) and Western Germany





















































































(a) Including East Berlin.
Source : Statistisches Bundesamt 1991b.- 95 -
Table A4 Average Monthly Wage per Employeea)






















































Monthly in East Marks, and in DM since the third quarter of 1990.
Data for the economy and the sectors may not be consistent.
Inclduing special payments due to the discontinuation of funds and reserves
prior to the currrency conversion.
Wage per employee (including short-time workers).
For full-time employees.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1991b)Table A5
- 96 -









































































































































(a) The figures at current prices include transactions of the former 6DR with for-
eign countries.
Source: Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundesbank,
Reihe 3, Zahlungsbilanzstatistik. - Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 7,
Reihe 1, Zusammenfassende Ubersichten fur den Aupenhandel. - Own calcula-
tions .- 97 -
Footnotes;
* I appreciate critical comments from Alfred Boss, John Black,
Michael Burda, Bert Hofman, Rainer Maurer, Maurice Obstfeld,
Michael Rauscher, Birgit Sander, Klaus-Werner Schatz, Holger
Schmieding, Klaus-Dieter Schmidt, Peter Trapp, Charles Wyplosz,
and participants of the Economic Policy Panel meeting in London,
April 18. and 19., 1991. The paper includes data that were
available up to May 10, 1991.
The distinction of property rights and ownership uncertainty is
crucial for the comparison of the German, and Eastern European and
the USSR case. In the German case, property rights are clearly
established, but there is uncertainty with respect to ownership.
In the USSR and to some extent in Eastern Europe, property rights
themselves are uncertain.
2
Data for 1991 are not available.
The Marshall plan is often cited as one important factor
contribution to a quick recovery in Western Germany. But it
accounted only for 1.4 % of West German GNP whereas West German
transfers to East Germany make up more than half of the GNP in
Eastern Germany.
4
The foreign currency coefficient rose from 2.4 (1980) to 2.9
(1985) and to 4.4 (1988) indicating a depreciation of the East
German Mark.- 98 -
This statement does not contradict Table A4 where the wage level
in Eastern Germany is roughly 40 % of the West German level. The
average East German wage has been calculated by dividing the wage
sum by the number of persons employed. This number includes more
than 1.7 million short time workers in the last quarter of 1990.
An interesting question is to what extent subsidies to new capital
and subsidies to labour benefit the price of the immobile factor
land and increase land prices.
7
Note the unusual increase of the monthly wage in the first two
quarters of 1990 prior to the currency union (Table A4).
p
For a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the capital stock of
Eastern Germany after adjustment see Siebert (1990c).
Q
This requires high anticipatory capabilities especially for an
open economy where financing may affect exchange rate
expectations, exchange rates and thus the asset position of
individuals as well as the real side of the economy.
The definition is different from that in tables 5 and 7.
Monthly averages, Data: The Economist, various Issues.
12
Monthly averages, constructed from the official daily figures,
Blick durch die Wirtschaft.- 99 -
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